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The purpose of this study was to analyze the role of social norms and cognitive processes in cooperative decisions 
in a non-probabilistic self-selected sample of Psychology freshmen attending the Universidad Nacional de 
Córdoba (Argentina). Two studies were conducted (Study 1: n = 124; Study 2: n = 104). In both of them a factorial 
design implemented in 2 phases was used: (a) cooperative environment and non-cooperative environment, using 
the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) and (b) time response conditions (Study 1) or cognitive load conditions 
(Study 2). In this stage participants played the Public Goods Game. The level of cooperation in the second stage 
was the main dependent variable. Student' t test, logistic and linear regression analyses, and univariate and 
multivariate analyses of variance were carried out. The manipulation for generating several social norm 
environments was not effective. Multiple effects on cooperation were observed depending on which indicators of 
cognitive processing were considered. The main finding of this study is an interaction effect between the social 
norm environment and the cognitive load condition in the first PDG round (Study 2). 
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El objetivo de esta investigación fue analizar el rol de las normas sociales y los procesos cognitivos en las 
decisiones cooperativas en muestras no-probabilísticas de auto-selección de ingresantes a Psicología de la 
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (Argentina). Se llevaron a cabo 2 estudios experimentales (Estudio 1: n = 124; 
Estudio 2: n = 104). En ambos se utilizó un diseño factorial en 2 fases: (a) contexto cooperativo o no cooperativo, 
utilizando el Juego del Dilema del Prisionero (JDP), y (b) condición de tiempo de respuesta (Estudio 1) o de 
esfuerzo cognitivo (Estudio 2), utilizando el Juego de Bienes Públicos. El nivel de cooperación fue la principal 
variable dependiente en la fase 2. Se utilizó t de Student, análisis de regresión logística y lineal y análisis 
univariados y multivariados de la varianza. La manipulación para generar distintos contextos normativos fue 
inefectiva. Se observaron distintos efectos en la cooperación según el indicador de procesos cognitivos usado. El 
principal resultado corresponde a la interacción entre el contexto social normativo y la condición de carga 
cognitiva en la primera ronda del JDP (Estudio 2). 
Palabras clave: cooperación, normas sociales, procesos cognitivos, juegos experimentales 
The development of human societies relies on cooperation. Nowak (2012) proposed five mechanisms 
through which cooperation can evolve: kin selection, multilevel selection, spatial selection, direct 
reciprocity, and indirect reciprocity. With the aim of explaining why evolution has favored cooperation, 
researchers have carried out several experiments using experimental games that explore these 
mechanisms in the lab (Bolton, Katok, & Ockenfels, 2005; Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006). While such 
questions have dominated cooperation studies for years, some authors have started to explore what 
happens when the mechanisms of cooperation are absent, focusing their attention on cognitive processes 
(Rand & Nowak, 2013). 
In relation to the study of cooperation, most articles about cognitive processes follow Kahneman's 
proposal that decisions result from the interaction between two systems, an intuitive one (System 1) and 
a deliberative one (System 2; e.g., Peysakhovich & Rand, 2016; Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012; Rand & 
Kraft-Todd, 2014). We built on this proposal in our study. Studies on this topic have not always yielded 
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consistent results (Cappelen, Nielsen, Tungodden, Tyran, & Wengström, 2014; Cornelissen, Dewitte, & 
Warlop, 2011; Halali, Bereby-Meyer, & Ockenfels, 2013; Hauge, Brekke, Johansson, Johansson-Stenman, 
& Svedsäter, 2009; Hauge, Brekke, Johansson, Johansson-Stenman, & Svedsäter, 2014; Lotito, Migheli, 
& Ortona, 2013; Nielsen, Tyran, & Wengström, 2014; Piovesan & Wengström, 2009; Rand et al., 2012; 
Rubinstein, 2007; Schulz, Fischbacher, Thöni, & Utikal, 2014; Tinghög et al., 2013) and—to the best of 
our knowledge—only a few have been conducted in Latin American countries. 
In order to shed light on the controversial question about the processes involved in cooperation and 
to encourage the study of cooperation in the local context, we propose to examine the effects of social 
norms and two indicators of cognitive processing—time responses (Study 1) and cognitive load (Study 2)—
on the cooperative decisions of students in multiple experimental games. We present the results of two 
experimental studies, each of which comprised two stages. In stage 1 of both studies, the generation of 
social norms was not effective, while the results of stage 2 differed across studies depending on which 
indicator of cognitive processing was considered. 
Our study can generate empirical evidence to contribute to cooperation literature. It is important for 
our future as a society to conduct this type of experimental research, since it reveals how people make 
cooperative decisions and which environments favor or undermine cooperation. The complexity of the 
study of cooperation requires the contribution of a wide range of disciplines, such as psychology or 
economics, or a mix of them (new approaches of behavioral economics). Furthermore, most research on 
cooperation has taken place predominantly in the United States (Yale University and Harvard 
University) and Germany (Max Planck Institute for Human Development). Some authors suggest that 
there is some cultural variability in the results of studies on cooperation, affecting elements such as 
reasoning and perception styles, among others (e.g., Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Although 
there are studies of cooperation in our immediate context (Latin America; e.g., Cárdenas & Jaramillo, 
2007), they are scarce in comparison to other regions. Thus, this article seeks to contribute to the local 
development of this topic, facilitating the establishment of new lines of research. Moreover, the fact that 
manipulating the generation of social norms was not effective in either studies of our research, makes it 
possible to initiate a discussion about the use of the framework of repeated games for this purpose and to 
think about new ways to manipulate social norms. 
Regarding the experimental design we used, we also make a contribution. Although we followed the 
procedure employed by Peysakhovich and Rand (2016), our studies are not a direct replication of their 
study. Only Stage 1 in both studies is similar to that implemented by the authors, so it can be considered 
a direct replication according to Schmidt (2009). Nevertheless, we made several modifications in stage 2 
of both studies, an approach that brings our work closer to a conceptual replication according to Schmidt 
(2009). Basically, a conceptual replication consists in testing hypotheses or results from a previous study 
but using a different experimental set-up. In stage 2, we included repeated rounds of two experimental 
games instead of one instance of different games. Taking into account differences in cooperation in games 
with different possibilities for future interaction (Dal Bó, 2005; Rand & Nowak, 2013), we intended to 
evaluate the effects of several experimental manipulations throughout multiple rounds. Another 
difference in stage 2 is related to the addition of cognitive processing indicators. Due to controversial 
results regarding cognitive processes and cooperation, we decided to work with two indicators: time 
pressure and cognitive load. Moreover, we added a validated version of the Rational Experiential 
Inventory. Peysakhovich and Rand (2016) used the Cognitive Reflection Test, but we did not have clear 
evidence of its usefulness in our context. Additionally, we included a measure to explore external validity, 
for which subjects had the possibility of choosing whether to donate or not the money earned in the 
experimental games. Below we explain in more detail all these similarities and differences with respect 
to the original article. 
We structured the rest of the article as follows. First, we present a review of the literature together 
with the main objectives and hypotheses. Then, we lay out the method and results of Study 1 and Study 
2. Finally, we discuss the results based on previous studies. 
Literature Review, Objectives, and Hypotheses 
Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH) 
This recent approach (Peysakhovich & Rand, 2016; Rand et al., 2014) holds that individuals develop 
heuristics in their social interactions and that these are shaped in everyday experiences. Strategies which 
are commonly advantageous become automatic in other contexts, like default responses. Subsequently, it 
is assumed that automatic cooperative responses are formed outside the lab in various contexts via the 
mechanisms leading to the evolution of cooperation outlined above (Rand et al., 2014; Rand & Nowak, 2013). 
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In this regard, Peysakhovich and Rand (2016) offer evidence in favor of the SHH through a two-phase 
study. In stage 1, subjects were exposed to several environments of cooperative and non-cooperative social 
norms. In stage 2, subjects were exposed to only one round of multiple experimental games. Researchers 
demonstrated that participants exposed to a cooperative environment (CE; stage 1) were substantially 
more cooperative in the first rounds of the various experimental games (stage 2), with these effects being 
more noticeable in subjects who relied more on their intuitions or heuristics to make decisions. Similarly, 
in another study carried out by Rand and Kraft-Todd (2014), the results were also in favor of the SHH. 
Results showed that a decision made under time pressure increases contribution between subjects who 
trust each other in their daily interactions and who have no previous experience in these games. Another 
study also found that intuition promotes cooperation only in those subjects without previous experience 
with the virtual platform where experiments were conducted (Mturk; Rand et al., 2012). In this paper, 
we offer new evidence about the SHH using a sample of Argentinean university students. 
Social Norms 
Human beings must share social norms to live in CE. One of the methods used to generate social 
norms in the lab –which has strong empirical support– consists in the repetition of experimental games 
(Peysakhovich & Rand, 2016). In this study, we replicated the generation of social norms implemented 
by Peysakhovich and Rand (2016). Like these authors, we expected that subjects exposed to CE would 
internalize cooperative norms and that those exposed to non-cooperative environments (NCE) would 
internalize non-cooperative norms (Hypothesis 1, H1). 
Cognitive Processes 
The cognitive processes involved in the decision of cooperating or not cooperating have been studied 
in different ways (Kinnunen & Windmann, 2013; Rand et al., 2012; Rand et al., 2014). One of the methods 
used by researchers to distinguish between these processes consists in measuring the subject's response 
times. System 1 is associated with fast responses, while System 2 is associated with slow responses 
(Kahneman, 2012). Consequently, to manipulate the response time, two experimental conditions—time 
pressure and time delay—are generated. This procedure has been used by Rand et al. (2012), among other 
researchers, who pose the question of whether human beings are intuitively selfish or intuitively 
cooperative. These researchers observed that forcing subjects to decide quickly increases contributions in 
experimental games, while forcing them to decide more rationally decreases contributions. 
Furthermore, similar results to those of Rand et al. (2012) have been found (Cappelen et al., 2014; 
Lotito et al., 2013; Nielsen et al., 2014; Rubinstein, 2007). Nevertheless, other studies provide evidence 
which stands in opposition to previous results (Piovesan & Wengström, 2009; Tinghög et al., 2013). Thus, 
in our first study we compared the level of cooperation between two response time conditions: time 
pressure and time delay. Like Rand et al. (2012), we expected that subjects in the time pressure condition 
would contribute more in the first round of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) and the Public Goods 
Game (PGG) than subjects exposed to the time delay condition. Moreover, a decrease in cooperation is 
expected across PGG rounds (Guala, 2005), with the time pressure condition being associated with a 
smaller drop in cooperation than the opposite condition. We also evaluated the possible effects of 
interaction between the normative environment (stage 1) and the time response condition (stage 2) on 
cooperation in the PDG and in the PGG (Hypothesis 2, H2). 
Besides response time, cognitive load is used as an indicator to differentiate systems 1 and 2. 
Researchers generally allocate subjects in two conditions: high cognitive load (HCL) and low cognitive 
load (LCL). In the HCL condition, system 1 has a stronger influence than system 2, because the subject 
is busy with a more complex task and is similar to the time pressure condition (Kahneman, 2003). 
One of the tasks which are most commonly used to manipulate the cognitive load consists in 
memorizing a series of numbers or letters (e.g., Duffy & Smith, 2014; Hauge et al., 2009; Hauge et al., 
2014). Like those on response time, studies on cognitive load have yielded contradictory results. Similar 
to Schulz et al. (2014), Kessler and Meier (2014) observed that subjects cooperate more in the HCL 
condition. However, in a subsequent replication, they found the opposite result (in line with Halali et al., 
2013): on average, subjects in the LCL condition donated more than those in the HCL condition. Other 
authors found no differences in cooperation between cognitive load conditions (Cornelissen et al., 2011; 
Hauge et al., 2009; Hauge et al., 2014). 
In our second study, we followed the same objectives as in stage 2 of Study 1, but using another 
indicator of cognitive processing. In this case, following Schulz et al. (2014), we expected that subjects 
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exposed to a HCL condition would cooperate much more than subjects exposed to a LCL condition in the 
first PDG round and also in the first PGG round (Hypothesis 3, H3). 
Cognitive Processing Style 
In addition to the above indicators used to assess dual processes, researchers have developed 
measures aimed at estimating the willingness of an individual to decide in a rational or in an experiential 
manner. One of them, the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 
1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999), was administered in this study. This inventory has been proven to have 
adequate psychometric properties in several countries, such as the United States of America, Sweden, 
and Argentina (Björklund & Bäckström, 2008; Reyna & Ortiz, 2016; Witteman, van den Bercken, Claes, 
& Godoy, 2009). 
Therefore, in line with Kinnunen and Windmann (2013), we expected that higher scores in the 
experiential dimension would be related to cooperative behavior in games (Hypothesis 4, H4). 
External Validity 
Some authors have studied whether individuals act in the same way in laboratory experiments as in 
real-life situations, especially when cooperation is involved (Levitt & List, 2009; List, 2008). For instance, 
Levitt and List (2007) suggest that cooperative behavior could be very different because participants in 
the lab know that their behavior is controlled and maybe they cooperate only because they want to please 
the experimenter. Hence, we think it is important to evaluate the relationship between cooperative lab 
decisions and real-life decisions. In this study, participants had the possibility of donating or not donating 
the money earned in the experimental games to a citizen or non-governmental organization of their 
choice. Like Benz and Meier (2008) and Peysakhovich, Nowak, and Rand (2014), we expected that the 
decisions of cooperation in the experimental games would be directly related to the decision to donate the 
money earned (Hypothesis 5, H5). 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. We used a non-probabilistic self-selected sample (Romero & Bologna, 2011; Sterba & 
Foster, 2008), composed of 124 Psychology freshmen enrolled in the Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, 
Argentina. We determined the sample size on the basis of previous studies with similar experimental 
conditions (e.g., Peysakhovich & Rand, 2016). A total of 100 students (57 female, M = 19.63, SD = 2.69) 
fulfilled the inclusion criteria (Psychology freshman enrolled at the Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, 
Argentina). Due to the fact that a participant did not fulfill the inclusion criteria, we discarded the first 
session, which included a total of 24 students. 
Design and experimental tasks. We implemented a 2 x 2 factorial design in two phases (Figure 1). 
In stage 1, we defined the first independent variable, allocating subjects to one of the social norm 
environments: cooperative and non-cooperative. In stage 2, we exposed subjects to two different response 
time conditions: time pressure and time delay. The main dependent variable was the level of cooperation 
in stage 2, in which subjects played six repeated rounds of the PDG and the PGG. 













PDG PDG & PGG 
 
Figure 1. Experimental design (Study 1). PDG = Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game; PGG = Public Goods Game. 
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In stage 1, to create social norm environments, each subject played a random number of PDG rounds. 
At the beginning of each game, we matched subjects in pairs. Each game consisted of a random number 
of rounds. Both subjects had to decide simultaneously whether to cooperate or not with their partner, 
using the same payoff as Peysakhovich and Rand (2016). 
At the end of each round, we informed subjects of their partner's decision and of each player's earnings 
for each round. Then, they played another round with the same partner, or the game finished (with 
specified probability) and we re-matched subjects with a new partner. We used the same probabilities 
employed by Peysakhovich and Rand (2016). 
The initial amount of money received in this game consisted in 40 experimental monetary units (MUs) 
in the CE and 150 MUs in the NCE. We established this difference in order to guarantee that subjects 
would finish stage 1 with similar earnings in both conditions (Peysakhovich & Rand, 2016). 
In stage 2, subjects made decisions in the PDG (six rounds) and the PGG (six rounds) under one of 
the following time response conditions: (a) time pressure: subjects had to respond as quickly as possible 
in a 10-second interval; (b) time delay: subjects had to decide carefully, wait, and think for at least 10 
seconds before answering. In the PDG, we randomly paired subjects, who had to decide simultaneously 
whether to cooperate with their partner. We used the same payoff matrix as Rand et al. (2014). 
In the PGG, subjects played six rounds in groups of four with the same partners, i.e., the groups did 
not vary. Subjects received an initial endowment of 20 MUs. The total amounts contributed to the common 
pool were multiplied by 1.6 and then partitioned equally among all four group members, regardless of 
how much each had contributed. 
Instruments.  
Rational-Experiential Inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). We used a version of the Rational-
Experiential Inventory studied by Reyna & Ortiz (2016). The inventory measures different ways of 
processing information and consists of two major dimensions: Experiential and Rational. The 
Experiential dimension includes 15 items (“Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring 
out problems in my life”), while the Rational dimension comprises 13 items (“I enjoy solving problems 
that require hard thinking”). The items are scored on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = totally false, 5 = totally 
true). High scores in the items of one dimension, for example, the Rational dimension indicated a greater 
inclination to use that modality of thinking. The instrument has shown adequate psychometric properties 
in our context. Specifically, Reyna and Ortiz (2016) provided evidence of internal validity through 
exploratory and confirmatory analysis, replicating the bifactorial structure observed in previous studies 
(see Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Witteman et al., 2009). In addition, they obtained evidence of adequate 
properties of internal consistency, with Cronbach's alpha coefficients of 0.84 for the Experiential 
dimension and 0.80 for the Rational dimension. In the present study, we found good internal consistency 
indices (Cronbach's alpha) for both dimensions (Experiential: 0.88; Rational: 0.83). 
Sociodemographic questionnaire. Participants reported their gender, age, place of birth, place of 
residence, the initials of their full name, and the last three digits of their DNI (national identity document). 
Procedure. We carried out five experimental sessions with 12 subjects and five sessions with 8 
subjects. The procedure comprised the following steps (Figure 2). We randomly assigned subjects to a 
computer (see Appendix 1). They signed an informed consent form and we read the instructions out loud 



















Figure 2. Experiment timeline (Study 1 and Study 2). REI = Rational and Experiential Inventory. 
We used the z-Tree software package (Fischbacher, 2007) to carry out the experiments. Subjects 
answered five control questions to check their understanding of the instructions and we informed them 
about their earnings at the end of the experimental games (min = 15 Argentine pesos, max = 35 Argentine pesos). 
After that, subjects were given the opportunity to donate their earnings to a nongovernmental organization 
of their preference. Then, they completed the inventory described and the sociodemographic questionnaire. 
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At the end of the study, only those who chose not to donate the money earned in the games received 
the experimental monetary units converted to cash (1 MU = 30 Argentine pesos). 
Data Analysis. Using STATA 12, we analyzed the data in two formats, arranged in two ways: (a) the 
decisions made in each round in a different column (wide) and (b) the decisions made in every round in a 
single column (long). We used a significance level of 0.05 for all the analyses. 
To assess cooperation at stage 1, we considered the total amount of cooperation and cooperation across 
rounds. To compare the mean cooperation between CE and NCE settings we calculated Student' t test. 
We applied logistic regression analysis to assess if rounds affected cooperation in both normative 
environments. To calculate standard errors, we considered the session as grouping level. 
In stage 2 we compared cooperation according to time response conditions in PDG and PGG, 
evaluating Student' t test. We then conducted logistic regression analyses to assess whether the predictor 
variables help explaining the first cooperation decision and repetitive PDG decisions (dependent 
categorical variable). On this occasion, we computed standard errors considering subjects who had 
interacted over six rounds with the same partner. We used the pair as a cluster. Also, we conducted linear 
regression analyses to evaluate the effects of treatment on cooperative decisions (contribution, continuous 
variable). We calculated standard errors (bootstrapping) considering the group in which subjects had 
interacted during the game. Considering the measurement variable level, we complementarily analyzed 
the data using analysis of variance (ANOVA). The unit of analysis considered was the group (four subjects 
each; 25 groups). The dependent variable was the sum of subject contributions of each group in each 
round, while the independent variables were their treatment in stage 1, in stage 2, and their interaction. 
We also conducted a multivariate variance analysis (MANOVA) to consider contributions across all 
rounds (repetitive rounds). Then, we evaluated decisions in each round through univariate analyses, 
using the Tukey test for post hoc analysis. 
Finally, we conducted a logistic regression analysis to evaluate whether cooperative decisions made 
in experimental games predict the subject's willingness to donate. 
Results 
Stage 1: Cooperative and non-cooperative social norms environments (H1). Subjects in the 
CE cooperated 18.08 (37%) times on average (min = 0, max = 36), while subjects in the NCE cooperated 
10.04 (20%) times on average (min = 0, max = 36). There was a difference in mean cooperation between 
both settings, t(92) = -3.58, p < 0.001, d = -0.71, 95% CI [-0.22, -0.06] (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Total cooperation according to social norms environments in stage 
1 (Study 1). 
As shown in Figure 4, the subjects' cooperation across rounds was different in both environments, 
specifically from round number 28 onward.  
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Figure 4. Cooperation according to social norms environments across rounds in 
stage 1 (Study 1).  
In a first logistic regression model (Table 1), we included the social norm setting as the only predictor 
variable. The global fit of this model was significant, p < 0.001, although the Pseudo R2 (0.02) was low. 
However, the results confirmed the differences in cooperation between social norm environments, 
p = 0.001. The value of the odds ratio (OR) in Table 1 indicates that the CE doubles the probability of 
cooperation, in comparison to the NCE. 
In a second regression model (Table 1), we included rounds as a predictor variable. The global fit of 
this model was slightly higher than that of the previous model, Pseudo R2 = 0.03, p < 0.001. In this case, 
we found no effect of the social norm setting, p = 0.196, but we did find a significant contribution of rounds, 
p < 0.001. The value of the OR in Table 1 indicates that the probability of cooperating in a given round is 
0.98 times lower than in the previous round, i.e., the probability of cooperating decreases as the rounds 
proceed. In addition, there is an interaction effect of social norms and cooperation, p = 0.012. In the CE, 
cooperation increases across rounds. In contrast, we observed a decrease in cooperation as rounds 
progress in a NCE. 
Table 1 
Effects of Social Norm Environment and Rounds on Cooperative Decisions of Stage 1 (Study 1) 
 
Predictor 
Model 1 Model 2 
b SE p OR 
95% CI 
for OR 
b SE p OR 
95% CI 
for OR 
Stage 1 – CE = 1  0.75  0.22   0.001 2.11 1.35, 3.27  0.31 0.24    0.196 1.37 0.85, 2.20 
Rounds      -0.02 
     
0.01 
< 0.001 0.98 0.96, 0.99 
Stage 1 x rounds       0.02  0.01    0.012 1.02 1.00, 1.03 
Constant -1.41 0.15 < 0.001 0.25 0.18, 0.33 -0.81 0.21 < 0.001 0.44 0.29, 0.68 
Pseudo R2    0.023        0.031     
N 5204     5204     
Note. CE = cooperative environment; b = observed regression coefficient; SE = standard error; OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence 
interval. Standard errors grouped at the session level (bootstrapping). 
Stage 2: Response time treatments, time pressure and time delay (H2, H4). In the PDG, 
subjects cooperated an average of 1.69 times (min = 0, max = 6) under the time delay condition and 2.06 
times (min = 0, max = 6) under the time pressure condition, with no difference between them, t(98) = -0.95, 
p = 0.347. 
8 ORTIZ AND REYNA 
With reference to the first cooperative decision, the global fit of the logistic regression model was not 
significant, Pseudo R2 = 0.05, p = 0.558. Results indicate that cooperation was not affected by being 
exposed to different social norm environments and to a different time response condition. In addition, we 
examined the possible interaction effect between response time conditions and different CEs on the first 
cooperative decision, which produced no statistically significant results, b = 0.05, p = 0.970. We obtained 
similar results when the dependent variable comprised cooperation decisions over six PDGs, b = 0.77, 
p = 0.395. 
In the PGG, subjects under the time delay condition contributed an average of 10.59 MUs (min = 0, 
max = 20), while those under the time pressure condition contributed 11.79 MUs on average (min = 0, 
max = 20). There was no difference between conditions, t(98) = -1.13, p = 0.260. 
With regard to the linear regresion analyses, we first assessed a model considering the initial 
cooperative decision as the dependent variable, R2 = 0.05, p = 0.195. None of the variables predicted 
cooperation, neither the rational nor the experiential styles (Table 2). 
Subsequently, we tested another model, R2 = 0.05, p < 0.001, including the contributions across rounds 
as the dependent variable, social norm environments and response time conditions as predictor variables, 
and decision styles as covariables. Results (Table 2) showed that only rounds predict cooperation, with a 
lower level of cooperation being observed as the rounds progress; however, there is no effect when 
considering the interaction between rounds and treatments. 
Table 2 
Effects of Social Norm Environments and Response Time in the First Round and Across Rounds on 
Decisions in the Public Goods Game (Stage 2, Study 1) 
 
Predictor 
Cooperation 1 Cooperation 
b SE p 95% CI for b b SE p 95% CI for b  
1 = CE 1.02 1.96 0.604 -2.83, 4.86   2.88 1.94 0.138 -0.93, 6.69 
2 = TP 0.77 2.36 0.744 -3.85, 5.40   1.32 2.50 0.598 -3.57, 6.21 
Stage 1 x stage 2 1.19 2.97 0.689 -4.63, 7.00  -2.87 3.20 0.369 -9.13, 3.40 
Rounds      -0.62 0.27 0.020  -1.15, -0.10 
Stage 1 x rounds       0.27 0.38 0.479 -0.48, 1.02 
Stage 2 x rounds       0.52 0.41 0.203 -0.28, 1.32 
Stage 1 x stage 2 x rounds      -0.26 0.61 0.667 -1.46, 0.93 
Rational 0.90 1.08 0.405 -1.22, 3.02   0.40 0.69 0.567 -0.96, 1.75 
Experiential 1.85 0.97 0.057 -0.06, 3.76  -0.20 0.72 0.776 -1.61, 1.20 
Constant 1.79 5.01 0.721   -8.03, 11.61 10.02 4.19 0.015    1.96, 18.37 
R2   0.047        0.045    
N 100    600    
Note. CE = cooperative environment; TP = time pressure condition; b = observed regression coefficient; SE = standard error; 
CI = confidence interval; Cooperation 1 = cooperation in the first round; Cooperation = cooperation in all rounds. Standard errors 
grouped at the group level (bootstrapping). 
Considering the effects observed as the rounds progressed, we decided to evaluate regression models 
including cooperation in each PGG round (two to six, respectively: R2 = 0.15, p = 0.003; R2 = 0.07, 
p = 0.249; R2 = 0.04, p = 0.520; R2 = 0.06, p = 0.259; R2 = 0.09, p < 0.001; Table 3). The treatments applied 
in stage 1 and stage 2, their interaction, and the participants' decision styles were included as covariables. 
In these cases, we also calculated standard errors, clustering at the group level (bootstrapping). 
In the second PGG round, exposure to a different social norm environment in stage 1, p = 0.013, and 
to a different response time condition in stage 2, p = 0.024, together with the interaction between these 
stimuli, p = 0.005, made contribution in this round significantly predictable. This indicates that subjects 
exposed to a CE contributed more than those exposed to a NCE and also that subjects who made decisions 
under time pressure contributed more than those who made decisions without time pressure. 
 







Effects of Social Norm Environment and Time Response Condition on Decisions in Each Round (2, 3, 4, 5, 6) of the Public Goods Game 
(Stage 2, Study 1) 
 
Predictor 
Cooperation 2 Cooperation 3 Cooperation 4 
b SE p 95% CI for b b SE p 95% CI for b  b SE p 95% CI for b 
1 = CE  5.04 2.03 0.013   1.06, 9.01  5.10 2.13 0.017   0.93, 9.26  3.42 2.03 0.092 -0.56,7.40 
2 = TP  4.56 2.02 0.024   0.60, 8.53  2.69 2.04 0.186  -1.30, 6.68  3.02 2.02 0.135 -0.94, 6.99 
Stage 1 x stage 2 -8.00 2.88 0.005 -13.64, -2.36 -4.32 2.94 0.142 -10.09, 1.45 -4.47 2.66 0.093 -9.70, 0.75 
Constant  5.84 6.77 0.388    -7.43, 19.11 13.58 6.09 0.026      1.64, 25.52  5.19 6.67 0.436   -7.88, 18.26 
R2    0.116        0.065       0.039    
 
Predictor 
Cooperation 5 Cooperation 6 
b SE p 95% CI for b B SE p 95% CI for b  
1 = CE  3.89 2.05 0.058 -0.13, 7.91  4.51 2.15 0.036   0.29, 8.72 
2 = TP  1.74 1.95 0.373 -2.09, 5.57  6.05 2.89 0.001   2.33, 9.77 
Stage 1 x stage 2 -1.34 2.52 0.595 -6.27, 3.60 -5.80 2.89 0.045 -11.47, -0.14 
Constant  8.58 6.23 0.169   -3.63, 20.79 12.92 5.45 0.018     2.24, 23.60 
R2   0.058        0.095    
Note. CE = Cooperative environment; TP = time pressure condition; b = observed regression coefficient; SE = standard error; 
CI = confidence interval; Cooperation X = cooperation in each round. Standard errors grouped as group level (bootstrapping). 
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Then, to understand the interaction effect, we conducted a comparison pair analysis. This analysis 
proved that subjects exposed to a NCE in stage 1 and to a time delay condition in stage 2 cooperated less 
than subjects within a NCE in stage 1 and under a time pressure condition in stage 2, p = 0.024, and 
those exposed to cooperation in stage 1 and time delay in stage 2, p < 0.001. It should be mentioned that, 
when comparisons between pairs were performed correcting the amount of comparisons (Bonferroni's 
method), the differences mentioned were not significant, p = 0.145 and p = 0.078, respectively. 
In the third round, the treatment in stage 1 predicted the level of contributions, p = 0.017. Subjects 
exposed to a CE in stage 1 showed an increased contribution level in this round, compared to those 
exposed to a NCE. Treatment in stage 2 and its interaction with treatment in stage 1 were not predictors 
of cooperation. 
In the fourth and fifth round, none of the predictors helped explain contribution levels. 
In the last PGG round, results confirmed that exposure to different social norm environments, 
p = 0.036, and to different time response conditions, p = 0.001, as well as the interaction between these 
factors, p = 0.045, made contribution in that round significantly predictable. Similarly to round 2, this 
indicates that subjects who were exposed to a CE contributed more than those exposed to a NCE and that 
subjects who made decisions under time pressure contributed more than those who made decisions 
without time pressure. Next, we applied a pair comparison analysis to study interaction effects 
(Bonferroni's method). This analysis showed that subjects exposed to a NCE in stage 1 and to a time 
pressure condition in stage 2 cooperated more than those in a NCE in stage 1 and under a time delay 
condition in stage 2. Furthermore, subjects in the CE in stage 1 and under time pressure in stage 2 
cooperated more than those in the NCE in stage 1 and under time delay in stage 2 of the last PGG round.  
When considering contributions across all rounds (repetitive rounds), the MANOVA indicated that 
none of the effects were significant, i.e., the median contribution vectors did not differ according to 
experimental treatments, λ(3, N = 25) = 0.274, F = 1.48, p = 0.143. 
When we evaluated decisions in each round through univariate analyses, in round 2 there was an 
interaction between treatments in stage 1 and 2, η2p = 0.214; however, post hoc analysis did not show any 
differences, p = 0.415, p = 0.193, p = 0.993, p = 0.936, p = 0.578, p = 0.298 (Table 4). 
Table 4 
Effects of Social Norm Environment and Time Response on Decisions in Each Round of the Public Goods 
Game (Stage 2, Study 1) 
 
Predictor 
Coop.1 Coop. 2 Coop. 3 Coop. 4 Coop. 5 Coop. 6 
F(1,21) p F(1,21) p F(1,21) p F(1,21) p F(1,21) p F(1,21) p 
Stage 1 1.46 0.240 0.36 0.555 3.94 0.061 0.76 0.394  6.81 0.016 1.38 0.253 
Stage 2 0.66 0.427 0.04 0.836 0.19 0.664 0.22 0.645 0.74 0.399   6.18 0.021 
Stage 1 x stage 2 0.00 0.964   5.72 0.026 1.48 0.237 3.09 0.093 0.34 0.564 3.62 0.071 
Note. Coop. = Cooperation in each round. 
In round 5, we observed an effect of treatment in stage 1, η2p = 0.245: subjects within a CE in stage 1 
cooperated more (M = 53.23, SD = 10.81, 95% CI 47.46, 59.00 than subjects exposed to a NCE 
(M = 40.25, SD = 13.36, 95% CI 32.42, 46.91). In round 6, there was an effect of treatment in stage 2, 
η2p = 0.227: subjects who made decisions under time pressure cooperated more (M = 45.69, SD = 12.04, 
95% CI 39.54, 52,77) than subjects who made decisions without time pressure (M = 32.25, SD = 16.70, 
95% CI 23.84, 41.92). In the subsequent rounds, we observed no effects. 
External validity (H5). The logistic regression results indicate that cooperation in the PDG is not 
a predictor of willingness to donate, b = -0.07, p = 0.908, nor does it predict cooperation in the PGG, 
b = 0.08, p = 0.108. In sum, cooperative behavior in both experimental games was not related to the 
participants' willingness to donate the money gained in games. 
Summary 
In stage 1, we found differences between the cooperative and non-cooperative social norm 
environments. However, our results do not support H1. When rounds were considered in further 
regression analyses, the normative environment no longer helped explain cooperative behavior. In stage 
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2, contrary to H2, we found no differences between the response time conditions in terms of their effect 
on cooperation in the first round of any experimental games. In rounds 2, 3, and 6 of the PGG, cooperation 
was higher in the CE than in the NCE; also, cooperation was higher in the time pressure condition than 
in the time delay condition in rounds 2 and 6 (H2). Neither the rational nor the experiential dimensions 
were found to be related to the level of cooperation nor did we detect any links between cooperation in the 
experimental games and willingness to donate the money earned playing. The latter two results do not 
support either H4 or H5. 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants. We used a new non-probabilistic self-selected sample (Romero & Bologna, 2011; Sterba & 
Foster, 2008) composed of 104 Psychology freshmen of the National University of Cordoba, Argentina. Due to 
incomplete data, we considered a total of 96 students (70 female, M = 19.47, SD = 2.59) for further analyses. 
Design and experimental tasks. The experimental design included two between-subjects factors 
implemented in two phases (Figure 5). We carried out stage 1 treatment in the same manner as in Study 
1. In stage 2, we exposed subjects to different cognitive load conditions while they were playing six PDG 
rounds and six PGG rounds (see description in Study 1). The experimental conditions in stage 2 were the 
following: (a) low cognitive load (LCL): subjects were instructed to remember two digits; (b) high cognitive load 
(HCL): subjects were told to remember seven digits. Cooperation in stage 2 was the main dependent variable. 





High cognitive load 
Low cognitive load 
Non-cooperative 
environment 
High cognitive load 
Low cognitive load 
Dependent 
variables 
PDG PDG & PGG 
 
Figure 5. Experimental design (Study 2). PDG = Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game; PGG = Public Goods Game. 
Instruments and Procedure. We used the same materials and procedure as in Study 1 (see Figure 2). 
In Study 2, we carried out six experimental sessions with eight subjects and four sessions with 
12 subjects. Internal consistency indices (Cronbach's alpha) for REI dimensions were 0.85 for the 
experiential style and 0.83 for the rational style. 
Data Analysis. Using STATA 12, we analyzed the data in two formats, arranged in two ways: 
(a) with the decisions made in each round in a different column (wide) and (b) with the decisions made in 
every round in a single column (long). We used a significance level of 0.05 for all the analyses. 
To assess cooperation at stage 1 and to evaluate external validity we did the same analyses as in Study 1. 
In stage 2 we compared cooperation according to time response conditions in LCL and HCL, 
evaluating Student' t test. We then conducted logistic regression analyses considering as dependent 
variable the subjects' first decision while playing the PDG and also their decisions across all rounds. As 
predictor variables, we included the CE (stage 1), the cognitive load condition (stage 2), and the 
interaction of both variables. We also included experiential and rational decision styles as covariables. 
When the dependent variable was cooperation across rounds, we also included rounds as predictors. Also, 
we conducted linear regression analyses, including the contributions in the first PGG round as dependent 
variable in a first model, and the contributions across rounds as dependent variables. The predictors were 
the social norm environment, the cognitive load condition, and the interaction between treatments. When 
the dependent variable considered was the cooperation across rounds, the rounds were also included as 
predictors. We conducted an ANOVA considering the contribuction of each group (n = 24). 
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Results 
Stage 1: Cooperative and non-cooperative social norm environments (H1). Subjects in the 
CE cooperated 12.75 (24%) times in total, whereas subjects in the NCE cooperated 11.81 (23%) times in 
total. We found no differences between conditions, t(94) = -0.18, p = 0.858. 
As shown in Figure 6, we observed no differences in cooperation across rounds connected to the social 
norm environments to which subjects were exposed. 
 
Figure 6. Cooperation according to social norm environment across rounds in stage 1 
(Study 2). 
In a first logistic regression model (Table 5) we included the social norm environment as a predictor 
variable. The global fit of the model was low, Pseudo R2 = 0.00, p = 0.860. Social norm environments were 
not found to be predictors, i.e., the probability of cooperation in a CE was the same as in a NCE. 
Table 5  
Effects of Social Norm Environment and Rounds in Cooperative Decisions of Stage 1 (Study 2) 
 
Predictor 
Model 1 Model 2 
b SE p OR 
95% CI 
for OR 
B SE p OR 
95% CI 
for OR 
Stage 1 – CE = 1  0.04 0.23    0.860 1.04 0.66, 1.65 -0.08 0.25    0.753 0.92 0.56, 1.52 
Rounds      -0.02 
  
0.01 
   0.013 0.98 0.86, 1.00 
Stage 1 x rounds       0.01  0.01    0.626 1.01 0.98, 1.03 
Constant -1.19 0.13 < 0.001 0.30 0.24, 0.39 -0.66  0.07 < 0.001 0.52 0.46, 0.59 
Pseudo R2    0.000        0.013     
N 4976     4976     
Note. CE = cooperative environment; b. = observed regression coefficient; SE = standard error; OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence 
interval. Standard errors grouped at the session level (bootstrapping). 
In a second model (Table 5) we included the rounds as a predictor in addition to the social norm 
environment, Pseudo R2 = 0.01, p = 0.011. In this case, only the rounds explained cooperation (p = 0.013). 
The probability of cooperation in a given round is 0.98 times lower than in the previous round. Although 
the contribution of the rounds was significant, the interaction between the social norm environment and 
the rounds was not. 
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Stage 2: Cognitive load conditions, high and low (H3, H4). In the six PDG rounds, subjects 
under the LCL condition cooperated 0.24 times on average (min = 0, max = 6), whereas subjects in the 
HCL condition cooperated 0.15 times on average (min = 0, max = 6), with no difference between them, 
t(94) = 1.99, p = 0.049. 
In relation to the first cooperative decision, Pseudo R2 = 0.09, p = 0.005 (Table 6), results of the logistic 
regression analyses indicate that the social norm environment, p = 0.002, and the cognitive load condition, 
p < 0.001, predicted the first PDG decision. In this case, exposure to a CE during stage 1 increased 12.17 
times the probability of cooperating in the first PDG round, compared to a NCE. Moreover, exposure to a 
HCL condition increased 9.62 times the probability of cooperating, compared to a LCL condition. We 
found an interaction effect, p = 0.007. 
When decisions across rounds were considered (Table 6), the Pseudo R2 value was 0.029. The 
treatments (stages 1 and 2), the treatment interaction, and the rounds were not predictors of cooperation. 
We only found an interaction between cognitive load and rounds, p = 0.007. 
Table 6 
Effects of Social Norm Environments and Cognitive Load in the First Round and Across Rounds of the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game (Stage 2, Study 2) 
 
Predictor 
Decision 1 Decision 
b SE p OR 
95% CI  
for OR 
B SE p OR 
95% CI 
for OR 
1 = CE  2.50   0.81 0.002 12.17   2.50, 59.32  0.88 0.72 0.216 2.42 0.60, 9.84 
2 = HCL  2.26   0.61 0.000   9.62   2.89, 32.06  0.63 0.57 0.268 1.87 0.62, 5.70 
Stage 1 x stage 2 -3.28   1.21 0.007   0.04 0.00, 0.40 -1.21 0.97 0.213 0.30 0.04, 2.00 
Rounds       0.09 0.08 0.238 1.10 0.94, 1.98 
Stage 1 x rounds      -0.17 0.15 0.246 0.84 0.63, 1.13 
Stage 2 x rounds      -0.25   0.12 0.029 0.78 0.62, 0.97 
Rational  0.28 0.46 0.550   1.32 0.53, 3.28  0.11 0.22 0.411 1.12 0.74, 2.10 
Experiential -0.01 0.45 0.979   0.99 0.41, 2.37  0.22 0.27 0.785 1.24 0.64, 1.79 
Constant -4.02 2.02 0.046   0.02 0.00, 0.93  0.07 1.00 0.010 1.07 0.11, 0.53 
Pseudo R2    0.094        0.030     
N 96     576     
Note. CE = cooperative environment; HCL= high cognitive load condition; Coef. = observed coefficient; CI = confidence interval; 
Decision 1 = cooperation in the first round; Decision = cooperation in all rounds. Standard errors grouped at the group level 
(bootstrapping). 
In the PGG, subjects exposed to a LCL condition contributed 10.21 MUs on average (min = 0, max = 20), 
while subjects exposed to a HCL condition contributed 9.53 MUs (min = 0, max = 20). There was no 
difference between them, t(94) = 0.57, p = 0.571. 
In the model that considered the first-round decision, the fit was significant but the R2 value was low, 
0.05, p = 0.260. None of the variables predicted cooperation, neither the rational nor the experiential styles. 
We obtained similar results when the contributions in all rounds were considered as dependent 
variables, R2 = 0.05, p = 0.003. No variable proved to be a predictor of cooperation across PGG rounds. 
To assess decisions in each round, we used univariate analysis (Table 7). There was an effect in round 
number six due to the treatment in stage 1, η2p = 0.203: subjects who were exposed to a CE cooperated 
much more in this round (M = 44.33, SD = 19.24) than those exposed to a NCE (M = 29.75, SD = 11.55). 
We observed no other effect. 
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Table 7 
Effects of Social Norm Environment and Cognitive Load on Decisions in Each Round of the Public 
Goods Game (Stage 2, Study 2) 
 
Predictor 
Coop.1 Coop. 2 Coop. 3 Coop. 4 Coop. 5 Coop. 6 
F(1,21) p F(1,21) p F(1,21) p F(1,21) p F(1,21) p F(1,21) p  
Stage 1 3.62 0.072 2.07 0.166 0.44  0.514 0.00 0.989 0.73 0.404 5.08 0.036 
Stage 2 0.16 0.689 0.04 0.844 1.04  0.319 2.91 0.104 0.29 0.598 0.03 0.869 
Stage 1 x stage 2 0.47 0.501 0.77 0.391 2.76  0.112 0.65 0.431 1.31 0.266 2.05 0.168 
Note. Coop. = Cooperation in each round. 
External validity (H5). Cooperation in both experimental games (PDG and PGG) did not predict 
the subjects' willingness to donate, PDG: b = 0.06, p = 0.956; PGG: b = 0.06, p = 0.095. 
Summary 
In stage 1, we did not observe any differences in cooperation between social norm environments. This 
result does not support H1. In contrast, and in line with H3, the main finding of this study is the 
interaction effect between the social norm environment and the cognitive load condition on the first PDG 
round. However, we found no differences between cognitive load conditions in terms of their impact on 
cooperation in any of the PGG rounds. Results of H4 and H5 were consistent with those of Study 1. 
General Discussion 
This study aimed to provide new tools to discuss the role of social norms and cognitive processes in 
cooperation. In this section of the article, we discuss the results in relation to the main hypothesis. The 
discussion focuses on the social norm environments (stage 1) in both studies and on the basis of the 
multiple indicators of cognitive processing (stage 2) that we examined in both studies. 
Data analysis of stage 1 (Study 1) showed differences between the CE and the NCE. However, when 
rounds were considered in further regression analyses, the social norm environment no longer explained 
cooperative behavior. This suggests that cooperation was more closely associated with the rounds than 
with the social norm environment to which subjects were exposed, although in the visual inspection of 
both environments (cooperative and non-cooperative) revealed some particular curves. The experimental 
generation of social norms in the lab differed from the results of Peysakhovich and Rand (2016), who 
found remarkable differences in cooperation in United States students exposed to CE and NCE. 
The problems encountered when generating social norms in the lab were also confirmed in Study 2. 
We found no differences in cooperation between social norm environments. We consider that differences 
between our study results and those published by Peysakhovich and Rand (2016) could be related to 
cultural particularities of the payoff matrix valuation in the PDG. Some cross-cultural studies reveal 
different patterns of behavior in experimental games in different cultures (Henrich, 2000; Oosterbeek, 
Sloof, & van de Kuilen, 2004). Hence, it is possible for payoff matrices to be valued in a different manner 
by subjects in our local context (Cordoba, Argentina) and in the original study by Peysakhovich and Rand 
(2016, Boston, United States of America). In addition, we used repetition in the PDG to create social norm 
environments; however, as our results show, this was not an effective choice. We have identified other 
ways to generate social norm environments (e.g., reputation, punishment, competition between groups, 
and frame effect), a point that we will be mentioning later. 
Regarding stage 2, we expected that subjects who were under time pressure in Study 1 would 
contribute more than subjects exposed to a time delay condition in the first PDG and PGG round (Rand 
et al., 2012). This hypothesis was not supported by the results. Similarly, Tinghög et al. (2013) did not 
find any differences between the response time conditions in terms of the cooperation observed in the first 
round of both experimental games. However, we must remark that they carried out six experiments with 
particular response time conditions: only in the first study did the subjects play the PDG under similar 
time response conditions as in Rand et al. (2012) and our own study. 
We also observed particularities in the PGG and subsequent data analyses. In the study by Rand et 
al. (2012), like in our study, the subjects in the PGG had to use a PC screen to express how much of their 
initial amount they wanted to contribute to the common pool. In the study by Tinghög et al. (2013), the 
subjects had to decide between two options: keeping a certain amount or contributing a certain amount. 
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Therefore, unlike Rand et al. (2012) and us, the authors conducted a logistic regression analysis in the 
PGG instead of a linear regression analysis. 
In rounds 2, 3, and 6 of the PGG, cooperation was higher in the CE than in the NCE; also, cooperation 
was also higher in the time pressure condition than in the time delay condition in rounds 2 and 6. 
Although in the last round (number 6) response time had an effect, automatic response (i.e., under time 
pressure) could be biased by the accumulated experience in the game. As the rounds proceed, the subjects 
respond more quickly when they know the particularities of the game and, at this point, response 
conditions are not likely to produce the same effect as in the first round. 
In stage 2 of Study 2, we sought to compare cooperation under cognitive load conditions in the PDG 
and the PGG. Social norm environments, cognitive load conditions, and the interaction between them 
predicted cooperation in the first PDG round. Subjects who contributed more in the first round were those 
who were exposed to a social norm environment in stage 1 and to the high cognitive load condition in 
stage 2. The latter indicates that cooperative subjects make their decisions in an automatic, intuitive 
way. This result is consistent with Schulz et al.'s (2014) findings. However, Schulz et al. used a n-back 
task. Contrary to findings based on the first PDG round, we observed no differences in cooperation 
between the low and high cognitive load conditions in the other PDG rounds. 
Furthermore, we did not observe any differences between cognitive load conditions in terms of their 
impact on cooperation in any of the PGG rounds. These findings are consistent with most studies which 
use cognitive load as an indicator to assess cognitive processing (Cornelissen et al., 2011; Hauge et al., 
2009; Hauge et al., 2014; Kessler & Meier, 2014). 
Moreover, we assessed whether the different modes of information processing using the Rational-
Experiential Inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) were involved in experimental game decisions. Studies 
1 and 2 show that the rational and experiential dimensions are not related to the level of cooperation 
observed. Conversely, Kinnunen and Windmann (2013) found that subjects who scored higher in the 
experiential dimension kept less money in the Dictator Game and accepted less money in the Ultimatum 
Game. Peysakhovich and Rand (2016), using the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005), found that 
subjects who rely more on their intuition or heuristics to make decisions, and were exposed to a 
cooperative social norm environment, cooperated more in the first round of a variety of experimental 
games. 
We also evaluated whether decisions in the experimental games (stage 2) of both studies were related 
to the participants' willingness to donate the money earned playing the games to a non-governmental 
organization. However, we were unable to identify an association. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
One of the limitations of this study concerns the procedure used to create social norm environments. 
During the experiment, some subjects reported experiencing tiredness, since they had to play 53 rounds 
in the CE and 51 rounds in the NCE, which amounts to approximately 40 minutes doing the same task. 
Therefore, in future studies, researchers could evaluate the experience of participating in the experiment, 
e.g., feelings of tiredness, entertainment, or boredom. 
Additionally, instead of using repeated PDG rounds, we suggest manipulating the instruction frames. 
For example, in a description, the salience of a norm could be manipulated, thus enabling us to condition 
the subject's subsequent decisions. According to Belaus, Reyna, and Freidin (2016), the variation of the 
frame focused the participants' attention on a specific social norm in economics games, which influenced 
their subsequent responses. In this regard, it would be interesting to carry out an experiment in which 
the cooperative social norm condition is created by participating in an experimental game where the 
descriptive and the prescriptive norms are manipulated. 
Another limitation has to do with the manipulation of cognitive processes through time response 
indicators. Our study and previous works (Cappelen et al., 2014; Nielsen et al., 2014; Tinghög et al., 2013; 
Rand et al., 2012; Rubinstein, 2007) have focused on a linear relation between cooperation and time 
response. However, recent studies suggest that response time generally follows an inverted-U pattern, 
where extreme responses occur faster than intermediate ones. Accordingly, Evans, Dillon, and Rand 
(2015) have observed that extreme cooperative and selfish decisions occur faster than intermediate 
decisions. These findings affect the way in which time responses are interpreted and may help explain 
the variety of results found when response time is used as a cognitive process indicator in relation with 
cooperative decisions. 
16 ORTIZ AND REYNA   
As we have previously stated, there is no agreement in the academic literature about the impact of 
reflective and intuitive processes on cooperation when response time (Study 1) and cognitive load (Study 
2) are used. The variety of results published can be classified into three groups: (a) those that show that 
intuition promotes cooperation, (b) those that provide evidence that reflexive processing increases 
cooperation, and (c) those that do not show an interaction between cooperation and indicators that assess 
cognitive processes. 
According to Hauge et al. (2014), the differences found regarding the link between cognitive processes 
and cooperative decisions might be due to the use of different experimental games, which could affect the 
subject's decisions. The games that are most frequently used in these designs are the Dictator Game, the 
Ultimatum Game, the Trust Game, the PDG, and the PGG. Although all these games involve paying a 
personal cost to give a personal benefit to another player, each has its own variations and particular 
specifications. However, this possible explanation is called into question in a recent study by Peysakhovich 
et al. (2014), who report that decisions made in a game are related to decisions made in other games. These 
researchers observed a relation between all cooperative PGG, DG, and TG decisions (p < 0.001). 
Another possible explanation of these results concerns the various indicators of cognitive processing, 
response time, and cognitive load, which have particular forms of operationalization. Some studies define 
and compare decisions in different response time conditions (e.g., answering before 7/10 seconds versus 
answering after that time), while other studies regard the time response of each subject as a continuous 
measure. On the other hand, multiple tasks were employed to measure cognitive load (e.g., memorization, 
Stroop test, n-back task). Given how variable the results reported are, it would be interesting to carry out 
meta-analysis studies to clarify the role of cognitive processes in cooperation. 
In addition, we suggest using other scales besides the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 
1999) to assess cognitive processes in future studies, such as the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005). 
It would also be useful for future studies to consider other ways to evaluate external validity. For 
instance, one could follow the procedure described by Peysakhovich et al. (2014): at the end of the 
experiment, the researchers allowed the subjects to enrich the study by providing feedback about their 
understanding of the instructions, given that the formal writing used in them often creates confusion in 
a variety of situations. Interestingly, researchers observed a link between the subjects' cooperation in the 
experimental games and this collaboration task. 
Concluding Remarks 
In this article, we presented the results of two experimental studies. In Study 1, the generation of 
social norm environments in stage 1 was not effective, in contrast with Peysakhovich and Rand's (2016) 
findings. In stage 2, in line with Tinghög et al. (2013), we found no effects between time response 
conditions and cooperation. 
In Study 2, the generation of social norm environments was also ineffective. However, in stage 2 
cooperation was higher when subjects were exposed to a CE and to a high cognitive load condition (first 
PDG round), in contrast to other conditions in the PDG. 
Finally, this study aimed to provide new tools to discuss the role of social norms and cognitive 
processes in cooperation. We expect that this study will promote empirical research on the topic of 
cooperation in our immediate context (Latin America). Improving our understanding of how cooperative 
decisions are made and which situations encourage subjects to cooperate are of great importance for 
future interventions seeking to foster cooperative interactions. 
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Good morning/good afternoon. I would like to thank you for being here and participating in this study. 
First, please turn off your mobile phones. 
Today, you are going to play some experimental and computer games and you will also have to complete 
some questionnaires. The experiment will last about one hour. 
In this study, we aim to examine the individual decisions of people; here are no right or wrong answers. 
All information is anonymous and confidential. 
Throughout this experiment, you can earn experimental monetary units (MUs). At the end of the 
experiment, each of you will receive the amount of MUs that you earned in the games, converted to 
Argentine pesos with the following equation: 30 MUs = 1 Argentine peso. 
In addition to the money you earn playing the games, you will receive an additional 15 pesos. 
Before you begin, please read and sign the informed consent form. 
... 
Then I will read the instructions for the first task. The written instructions are next to your computer. 
If you do not understand something, please read the instructions again. If you still have questions or have 
a problem during the game, raise your hand and a team member will assist you. 
From now on you are not allowed to communicate with the rest of the participants. 
 
  




In this session, we sought to study the factors that explain cooperation. The main issues affecting this 
research project were the small number of studies in our local context, the variety of explanations of the 
results obtained by other researchers, and the limited contributions of psychology to the study of 
cooperation. 
To perform the study, we used two classical experimental games. 
In stage 1, you make decisions in different environments of cooperation. In stage 2, you make decisions 
in any of the following conditions: 
- Respond as quickly as possible and take your time to answer; or 
- Memorize a long or short number while making decisions. 
These tasks employ two different indicators (response time and cognitive effort) of cognitive processes in 
decision making. 
To summarize, this study is aimed at obtaining information about how cooperative decisions are made, 
which environments encourage individuals to cooperate, and to what extent these contexts have effects 




Now the study is over. 
I ask you, please, NOT to discuss the experiment with you partners. 
Now, please remain seated. We will tell you when you can leave… 
Thank you for your collaboration! 
Appendix 3 




El experimento consiste en dos fases: 1 y 2. Las decisiones que tomen en la Fase 1 no afectarán lo que 
suceda en la Fase 2. Podrán ganar Unidades de Dinero Experimental (UDE) en ambas fases. Las 




La Fase 1 consiste en una serie de interacciones con otras personas.  
En cada interacción, al comienzo cada uno será emparejado con otro participante de la sala y jugarán una 
cantidad aleatoria de rondas con ese participante.  
En cada ronda, cada participante tendrá que elegir entre dos opciones: A o B.  
La siguiente tabla muestra cuál será TU ganancia en cada ronda, la cual dependerá de tu elección y la 
del otro participante. 
 
Si TU elección es A y la elección del otro participante es A, ambos ganarán 4 UDE  
 
Si TU elección es A y la elección del otro participante es B, vos ganarás 0 y el otro ganará 5 UDE  
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Si TU elección es B y la elección del otro participante es A, vos ganarás 5 UDE y el otro ganará 0 
UDE  
 
Si TU elección es B y la elección del otro participante es B, ambos ganarán 1 UDE 
  
Deberás realizar tu elección dentro de los 30 segundos, si no lo hacés, la computadora hará una elección 
aleatoria por vos en esa ronda.  
Tu ganancia de cada ronda aparecerá en la pantalla de la computadora. Esa ganancia se sumará a tu 
cantidad actual de UDE. 
 
Recordá que la cantidad de UDE que tengas al final de todo el experimento determinará cuánto dinero 
vas a ganar.  
Después de cada ronda, la probabilidad de que juegues otra ronda con la misma persona es de 7/8 (7 
de 8) y la probabilidad de que la interacción con esa persona termine es de 1/8 (1 de 8).  
Esa probabilidad no depende de cuántas rondas ya hayas jugado. Luego de cada ronda se te informará si 
seguís jugando con la misma persona o si la interacción terminó.  
Una vez que la interacción con una persona termine, serás emparejado nuevamente con otro participante 
de la sala para una nueva interacción.  
Las elecciones que hagas no influirán en el número de interacciones que tengas ni el número de rondas 
en cada interacción. 
 
Resumen de la Parte A 
 
Cada interacción que tengas con otra persona en el experimento implica una cantidad aleatoria de rondas. 
En cada ronda, vos y el otro participante (con el cual serás emparejado), tomarán una decisión y esa 
decisión determinará tus ganancias para esa ronda.  
En cada interacción, después de cada ronda existe una probabilidad de 7/8 de jugar otra ronda con la 
misma persona. Tu comportamiento NO tendrá efecto sobre el número de rondas o el número de 
interacciones.  
Al principio del experimento, comenzarás con 40 UDE en tu cuenta. Vas a ganar UDE en cada ronda de 
cada interacción. Al final de todo el experimento, recibirás $1 por cada 30 UDE que haya en tu 
cuenta.  
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………  
Ahora, por favor, responde las preguntas que figuran en la computadora para asegurarnos que 
comprendiste la tarea.  
La Fase 1 comenzará con una ronda de práctica. Esa ronda no se tendrá en cuenta para tu ganancia final.  
Si tenés alguna pregunta, por favor hacela ahora. 
 
Recordá que no se permite la comunicación entre participantes.  
Si surgen dudas durante el experimento, primero consultá las instrucciones nuevamente. Si todavía tenés 
dudas o surge algún inconveniente durante el juego, levantá la mano y un miembro del equipo se acercará 
a tu lugar.  
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Appendix 4 
Example of the Instructions of Stage 2: Time Pressure Condition (in Computer) 
 
FASE 2 – CON PRESIÓN DE TIEMPO – RÁPIDO 
 
Fecha de recepción: Mayo de 2016. 
Fecha de aceptación: Noviembre de 2017. 
